DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 31, 2014

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director

FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending January 31, 2014

Sanjoy Sircar and Bradford Sharpless were on site this week to perform facility walk downs and to discuss several topics with DOE and the contractors.

Site Closure: DOE closed the site Tuesday afternoon, all day Wednesday, and part of the morning on Thursday when ice and snow threatened the area and made commuting both on and off site hazardous.

Department of Energy Training: The site representative reviewed the training of facility representatives (FR), safety system oversight, and senior technical safety managers at DOE-Environmental Management and NNSA. In general, people are keeping their qualifications up to date although some reassigned FRs are taking more than a year to complete their facility-specific qualifications when moved to a new facility. The site representative reviewed the difficulty and breadth/depth of the written exams for new and requalifying FRs in several divisions and found them to be adequate. FR managers have widely differing practices for documenting facility walk-through examinations. These range from a simple signature stating that it was conducted to 20+ page packages with written initial and follow-up questions to ask, expected responses, and detailed notes of the candidate's responses.

Tank Farms: Last weekend a fire alarm was received from the H-Area Diversion Box 8 (HDB-8), requiring emergency services to respond. SRR found that the # 2 vacuum blower had a loose belt that caused the smoke. When a facility representative analyzed the data, he determined this was the same event and same blower that also caused a fire alarm in December 2013. It appears the fact this blower was out-of-service was dropped from the electronic equipment condition log. On Saturday when normal equipment rotation is usually performed, the operator rotated the system from the operational #1 blower to the #2 blower that should have been out-of-service. SRR does not use equipment condition tags in the tank farms because the tags would quickly become illegible from weathering.

Tank Farm personnel have been attempting to replace the transfer pump in F-Pump Pit 1 for several months to allow material in F-Tank Farm to be transported to H-Tank Farm. As they neared the time when it was feasible to perform this operation, it became evident that the water in the pump tank had evaporated resulting in less shielding. In order to safely replace the pump, tank farms are going to have to exit the repair plan, enter the operations mode and fill the pump tank, and then reenter a new repair plan.

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF): Last week contamination was found on the third level canyon wall (\sim 3,000,000 $\beta\gamma$ resulting in 40 mrem/hr extremity). SRR removed the contamination from the wall and placed a plastic cover over the area. SRR engineering is evaluating the leak site to determine if a leak from the roof may have caused the material to migrate through the shield wall.